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ECENT volatility in both money and interest
rates has prompted the Federal Reserve Board to
adopt a plan for contemporaneous reserve accounting
(CRA).
1 This move follows a number of requests from
both insideand outside the Federal Reserve System to
return to CRA. These requests stem from empirical
investigations that show that both money and interest
rates hecame more volatile afterthe adoption of lagged
reserve accounting (LEA) in September 1968, and
from theoretical work that shows an increase involatil-
ity of money and possibly interest rates when the Sys-
tem moves from CRA to LEA.2
Daniel L. Thornton is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. John G. Schulte provided research assistance.
‘In the Board’s plan, CBA applies only to transactions accounts,
Reserve reqoiremmmemsts on time and savings accounts will continue
to be set on a lagged basis- For a concise summary of the Board’s
plaim for CRA, see Michael R. Pakko, “Lagged and Constemapora-
neornsReserve Accounting, Money Market Stability and Monetary
Control: A i’opical History of Recenmt US. Monetary Policy,’
Federal Reserve Bank of Richnnmond (1983),
2
The empirical work includes Alhert E, Bm-ger, “Lagged Reserve
Reqoiremnemits: Their Effects on Federal Reserve Operationss,
Money Market Stability, Member Banks and the Money Supply
Process,” nmnpohlishcd paper for the Federal Reserve Bank ofSt.
Louis (1971); Wan-en L. Coats, “Lagged Reserve Accounting and
the Money Supply Mechanism,” Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking (May 1976), pp. 167—180; Edgar L,. Feige and Robert
McGee, “Money Supply Control amid Lagged Reserve Account-
imsg,”JournalofMoney, Credit and Banking(November 1977), pp.
536—51; and \villianm Poole and Charles Lieherman, “Improving
Monetary Control,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
(2:1972), pp. 293—335-
The theoreticalwork includes Daniel F. Laufenherg, Contem-
porary Versus Lagged Reserve Accoumsting,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking (May 1976), pp. 239—45; Stephen F, LeRoy,
“MonetaryControl Ummder Lagged ReserveAccounting,” Southern
Economic Journal (October 1979), pp. 460—70; William Poole,
“Federal Reserve Operating Procedures: A Survey and Evaluation
ofthe Historical Record Since October 1979,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking (November 1982, part 2), pp. 575—96; and
Beunmett T. McCallum and James C, Hoehn, “Instrument Choice
for Money Stock Control With Contemnporaneous and Lagged
Recently, Feige and McGee presented evidence
that the effect of LEA on federal funds rate volatility
has not been substantial when week-to-week relative
changes are considered.3 Thus, previous empirical
work on the volatilityofshort-termimiterest rates under
LEA, which considered longer time periods or abso-
lute measures of variability, may be misleading. This
articlepresents a theoretical argument to further sup-
portthis conclusion. It should be emphasized that only
the case ofa move from CRA to LEAis considered, hut
the premise applies equallywell to the return to CRA.
The outlimie of the article is as follows: First, the
rationale for claiming that the case against LEA is
overstated is presented. This idea is then formalized in
the context ofa simple linear stochastic model ofthe
money supply process. Finally, the variability ofvar-
ions interest rates and money is examined and some
concluding comments are made.
THE RATIONALE
Theconcern that the theoretical case against LEA is
overstated is based on the application ofa simpleprin-
ciple: additional constraints are bimiding only if mdi-
Reserve Reqoirememsts,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
(Fehrnmary 1983), pp. 96—101,
Three recent empirical studies that employ stochastic model
siminlations suggest that the gain to monetary control from the
retorsm to CRA will he modest under a nonhorrowed reserve oper-
ating target. See David Lindsey and others, “Moneta,-y Control
Experience Under the New Operating Procedures,” Federal Re-
serve StaffStudy, New Monetary Control Procedures, February
1981, pp. 53—56; David 5, Jones, “Commtemporamieous vs. Lagged
Reserve Accounting: Implications for Monetary Control,” Eco-
nomnic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, November
1981, pp. 3—19; and Peter Tinsley and others,”Pohicy Robustness:
Specification amid Simulation ofa Monthly Money Market Model,”
Journal ofMoney, Credit and Banking (November 1982, part 2),
pp. 829—56,
‘See Edgar I~,Feige and Robert McGee, “Federal Reserve Policy
and Interest Rate Instability’ ,“ ‘I’he Financial Review (May 1982),
pp. 50—62.
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viduals behave differently than they would in the ab-
sence of these constraints.4 That is, if banks already
were behavingin much the samewaythat LEA permit-
ted them to, then the effect of its introduction on
individual and aggregate behavior would be small.
In order to see why this is the case, consider how a
depository institution might manage its reserve posi-
tion under CRA. Such aninstitution would be required
to keep a fraction ofits current checkable amid timeand
savings deposit liabilities in the form of reserves (vault
cash and deposits with the Federal Reserve).5 When
the institution makes loans and investments, it creates
deposits. Thus, it is usually presumed that there is a
direct link between the institution’s current lending
and investment activities and its current holdings of
reserves. In a simplified and, perhaps, naive form,
institutions lend only the amount of their excess
reserves.6 Some argue that LRA severs this link.
Under LEA, depository institutions’ reserve require-
mentsare based on deposit liabilities from a preceding
period. Depository institutions are free to make all the
loans and investments they desire in the current
period without affecting their current reserve
requirements.7
A depository institution’s decision to make addition-
alloans and investments need not be closely related to
its current holdings of reserves. In the short run it can
obtain additional reserves by purchasing federal funds,
borrowingfrom the Federal Reserve, selling Treasury
securities, managing its liabilities — such as marketing
certificates ofdeposits (CDs) more aggressively — or
by temporarily holding fewer excess reserves than it
4
Nearly all ofthetheoretical workon this subjectstarts with a model
that iscompletely static, LIlA is introduced, transforming the static
model to a dynamic one, It is clear that the conclusions of these
models are based, in part, on the factthat theyintroduce a dynamic
strmmcture to an othenvise static model; he,mce, these models pre’
elude the possibility that LRA introduces a dynamic structure that
is,at leastinpart, redundant, This paperconsiders thispossibility,
‘Because ofthe Monetary Control Act of 1980, depository institmm-
tions need not hold reserves directly on deposit with the Federal
Reserve. Instead, they may hold them with another depository
institution on a pass-through basis.
6
Actualhy, eachindividual hank hasits own short-run deposit mimlti-
phier, which enables it to lend more orless than its excessreserves
in the short run. See Boris P. Pesek and Thomas R. Saving, The
Foundations ofMoney and Banking (MacMillan 1968), chapters 12
and 13,
7
For a discussion ofthis possibility, seeR. Alton Gilbert, “Lagged
Reserve Requiremnents: Implications for Monetary Control and
Bank Reserve Management,” this Review (May 1980), pp. 7—20,
Fmmrthermore, some argue that, because ofthis, the Federal Re-
serve can only accommodate deposit expansion or contraction
under LIlA. For an alternative view, see Daniel L. Thornton,
‘Simple Analytics of the Money Supply Process and Monetary
Control,’ this Review (October 1982), pp. 22—39.
would otherwise like to hold. Thus, evenunder CEA, a
depository institution’s decision to make current loans
and investments is notconstrained by its current hold-
ings of reserves.8
Ofcourse, ifthere was a reserve deficiency and if it
were torun foran extended period oftime, the institu-
tion would have to adjust its lending and investment
activities to bring deposits into line with its reserves.
Furthermore, since onlythree ofthe abovetechniques
ofreserve adjustment relieve reserve pressure on the
system as a whole, depository institutions eventually
may find it necessary to adjusttheirlending and invest-
ment activities if rates on short-term reserve adjust-
ment assets rise relative to the institutions’ lending
rates.°
Thus, depository institutions musteventually adjust
their reserve positions by adjusting their loan and in-
vestment portfolios. For short-run (week-to-week)
changes, however, they can rely on either the money
market, changes in their holdings ofexcess reserves or
the discount window. The link between current lend-
ing and investment activities and current reserves
need not be strong.
A SIMPLE STOCHASTIC MODEL
In this section, the conjecture of the previous sec-
tion is formalized with a simple linear stochastic model
of the money stock. The model is intended only to
capture the essential features of money stock deter-
mination under CEA and LEA and to illustrate the
basic restriction associated with moving from CRA to
LEA. 10Th this sense, the model is illustrative andis not
5
Spindt and Tarhan also argue, along similar lines, that the case
against LRA maybe overstated. Furthermore, they provide some
empirical evidenceofthe extent to which banks rely on eachofthe
reserve adjnstmnent nnechanisms listed above. See Paul A. Spindt
and Vefa Tarhan, “Bank Earning Asset Behavior and Causality
Between Reserves and Money: Lagged Versuns Contemporaneous
Reserve Accoummting,’ Journal of Monetary Economics, forth-
coming.
“Both federal fundstrading andreducingthe levelofexcessreserves
tendto reduce the average levelofexcess reserves for the system as
a whole. This allows agiven reserve base tosupport alarger money
stock, Discountwindow borrowing increases thetotal reserve base
ofthe system.
0~
Theessential features are: (1) a contemporaneous link between
the reserve aggregate and the moneystock, even under LRA, (2)
aim explicit dynannic structure under both CRA and LRA, and (3)
random disturbances on both the supply amid demand side, In this
model, the contemporaneous link between the reserve aggregate
and the money stock is established only through the excess re-
serve equation. This isdone as a matter ofconvenience, The limik
could be established through thecurrency equation .,See Thorn-
tomn, “Simple Analytics of the Money Supply Process.”
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presumed to be a complete description ofmoney stock
determnination.
The model consists ofthe followingfour equations:
(1) R, RR, + ERn
(2) RR, 0mM, + (l—0)rM,_,
0 = 0, 1
(3) ER, 6?~I,+ pi, — X (RRn — mM, _,) + mmcm
6 > 0, p C 0, 0< X C 1
(4) M, = ~ + ai, + p.M,_ m + Oem
~ >0, a <0, p. ~0-
The random errors, net and umm, are assumed to have
zero expected values and finite variances, tr~and o~,,
respectively. Equations 1 through 3 represent the
money supply process.11 The first defines total re-
serves as required plus excess reserves. The second
defines required reserves as some required reserve
ratio,r, times the money stock; the parameter 0 allows
for either CEA (0 = 1) or LEA (0 = 0). In the third
equation, excess reserves are proportionally related to
the current money stock and inversely related to the
market interest rate, i~.The excess reserve equation
differs from most in that depository institutions make
some proportional adjustment, X, to changes in re-
quired reserves. If X = 1, depository institutions do
notadjusttheircurrent deposits tochanges inrequired
reserves. Instead, they absorb such changes by alter-
ing their holdings of excess reserves. 12 Equation 4i s
the standard short-run money demand specification,
where the market equilibrium condition has been
imposed.
Equation 3 is important because it allows the LEA
model to be given as a special case of the CEA model
(0 = 1). This canbe seen by solving for the equilibrium
money stock and interest rate. The reduced forms for
the equilibrium money stock and interest rate are
given by equations 5 and 6:
(5) Mm
1
—R, +‘~Yn + pp.~(r(l~)(l0)+Xr) M,_,
a0 a0 a0
a p
— —u,,, ~— 11’,,~
Ao A
0
‘mIt should he notedthat this model containmsonly a one-period lag,
whereas, as implennented, LRA has a two-period lag. The one-
period lag was adopted for compnmtational convenience,
“Excess reserves arc treated as a buffer-stock asset, Furthermore,
they are assured tohe strictly positive and sufficient to deal with
any reqnuredreserve surprises dineto randonmfluctuations inu,, or
u,,,,. This model is kept simple by considering explicitly only
resen’e adjustment throughexcess reserve holdings. It should he
clear, however, that the other adjustment mnecbauisms could be
modeled,
1 — 13(Or(1—X)+6)
(6) ii = —R, a0 a0





a(rO(1—X)+6) + p <0.
— umn.
Notethat equation 5i sthe sameif 0 = 0 or if X = 1;
the same istrue ofequation 6. That is, theequilibrium
money stock and interest rate are the same in a model
with CEA, where depository institutions do not initial-
lyalter their current lending and investmentactivities
to adjust their reserve positions (A = 1) as in a model
with LEA. Thus, imposing lagged reserve accounting
on the above model by letting 0 = 0 when A = 1 has no
effect on the money supply; depository institutions
would not have altered their lending and investment
activities immediately in response to changes in total
reserves anyway. The imposition ofLEA is redundant
if X= i.’3
Effects ofERA on the Money Supply
Solving the first three equations, the mnoney supply,
M5, is given by
I (r—(1—X)Or) p1
(7) M~ R, — M,_, ——i, — —u,., a, A
5
A, a,
where A~= Or(1 — A) + b. A comparison of the money
supply when 0 = 1 and when 0 = 0 reveals basic differ-
ences between LEA and CEA that should be noted.
First, the money supply schedule is more interest-
sensitive under LEA, as figure 1 illustrates.
Second, the multiplier on the reserve aggregate is
smaller for CEA than for LEA. ~ Thus, a given change
in the reserve aggregate shifts the money supply
schedule further under LRA, The shift is significantly
further so that the initial change in the equilibrium
money stock is greater tinder LEA (figure 1). Thus, a
given change in the policy variable (or any exogenous
shock on the supply side) produces a larger initial
‘
3
There is an implicit assumption that banik reserve adjustment
behavioris invariant to the reserve accounting system. Recently,
Spindtand Tarhanhave provided empirical evidence that thiswas
the case after LRA was introduced in 1968. It is inmteresting to
note, however, that theirevidence indicates that hammks relied less
on adjustinmg current loans amid investnnents and more on changes
in excess reserves, federal funds, discount window borrowings
and CDs after LIlA ‘vas introduced. The diffi,rences, however,
were nn>t statistically significant. See Spindt and Tarhan, “Bank
Earning As-set Behavior and Causality Between Resen-es amid
Money.’
‘trhe multipliers are 1/6 annl l/(r(l — A) + 6) for LilA and CRA,
respectively.
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F,gume
Money Supply Shills under CRA and IRA
It
At
change in the money stock and the interest rate under
LEA.
Finally, the money supply equation is dynamic
under LEA, but notunder CEAunless A >0. Thisis an
important difference. If the money supply schedule is
assumed to be static, as is common for CEA specifica-
tions, then the adjustment from initial to long-run
equilibrium is determined solely by the dynamnic struc-
tureofthe demandfor money. IfR. the money demand
coefficient on lagged money, is positive (as nearly all
the empirical work on the money demand equation
suggests), then the initial equilibrium under CEA will
be below the long-run equilibrium)” If only a static
model is considered (CEA with A = ~i. = 0) then the
imposition of LEA introduces a dynamic structure to
the model.16 In this case, the initial equilibriummoney
‘
tm
This would not be the case ifthere were strong distributed lag
effects on interest rates in themoney demand equation dominat-
ing the distributed lag effects on the money supply. However,
such effects seem absent from most empirical estimates ofmoney
demand. For an exception, see Daniel L. Thornton, “Maximum
Likelihood Estimates ofa Partial Adjustment-Adaptive Expecta-
tions Modelofthe Demand for Money,” ReviewofEconomics and
Statistics (May 1982), pp. 325—29.
‘°itshould lie noted that neither LEAnor an excess reserve equa-
tion like equation 3 isnecessary to get alagged effect on the money
supply. All that is required isthat theme be a lagged effect in the
public’s demand for a component ofa particular usonetamy aggre-
gate or reservahie asset, For examnple, a positive coefficient 0mm
either lagged currency or the time deposits in a standard money
stock model willhesufficient to causean initialovershootingofthe
stockwould be above its long-run equilibrium: deposi-
tory institutions initiallywould overexpand the money
stock and oscillate toward long-run equilibrium. Ii
LEA allows the current money stock to affect the
future money supply. In the complete model, with
lagged money in the money demand function, the
long-run equilibrium can be above or below the initial
equilibrium. The particular outcome depends on the
relative strength ofthe supply-side and demand-side
effects.
These results canbe illustrated by noting that equa-
tion 5 can be lagged and substituted into equations 5
and 6 to obtain the dynamic equations for the equlib-
rium money stock and interest rate:
(8) M,=—~-- ~ ~‘R,_J ~~
a0~0
a - p -














Letting E(M~) and E(i,) denote the expected valueof
these variables, the long-run response of money and





long-run equilibrium in these models if their effect is sufficiently
large relative to p..
‘
7
This is theresult obtained by Lanfenberg. I-Icbases his result on a
comparison of basic LIlA and CRA models with p. = 0; his CRA
model iscompletely staticwhilehis LEAmodel is dynamnic. Thus,
his long-run LRA mnnmltipliem was always less than his instantaneous
LIlA multiplier. See Laufenhemg, “Contemporary Versus Lagged
Reserve Accounting.”
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These results require the stability condition I < 1. Vam(M) = him Var (Mb
= o~for t = t’ and i =
E(u,,u
3~
.) I = o fort ~ tori $j
i — mu
+ l—1~”W4,where m~= ~_
k~am
These expressions reduce to
(iO) Var (Mr) = (a)2a~ +
and




Var (i~)= lim Var (i~).
Note thatthe long-run effectofa givenchangein the
reserve aggregate does notdepend on 0: it is invariant
to the reserve accounting system. H The reserve
accountingsystem affects onlythedynamic adjustment
toward long-run equilibrium, and then only ifdeposi-
tory institutions follow a path different from the one
they otherwise would have followed. Furthermore, a
comparison of the long-run money multiplier above
with the instantaneous multiplier of equation 5 shows
that, under CEA (0= 1), the long-run multiplier is
strictly smaller only if ~.a = 0, but may be larger or
smaller if j.a>’O, as discussed above. ~
Effects on the Vari-ahility of Money and
interest Rates
We turn now to the important question of the
variability ofmoney and interest ratestinder LEA and
CEA. In order to simplifr the analysis, the following
assumptions are made:
i, j = e, in.
Giventhese assumptions, the variance ofmoneyand
the interest rate for a k-period time horizon can be
expressed as
Var(M~’)= I -~- j’~+l-~--j’0-~, mlm
A0 A0
Vam(ih = ([I]’ + [~]‘~) cr~+ (I rO(i-A)+6 a0 a~ a0
+ ((m0(i—A)+6 )2 + ~ ~i a.
where I’ = [a(rO(i—A)+6)+pj’—[pp.—a(r(l —A)~ —0)+Ar)]’.
These expressions are independent of0 ifA = 1. That
is, ifdepository institutions already behave underCEA
as LEA would require them to behave, the introduc-
tion of LEA would have no effect on the variance of
money or interest rates. IfA < 1, however, themove to
LEA will increase the variance of money and may
increase the variance of interest rates, depending (in
part) on the relative magnitude of the variance of sup-
ply-side and demand-side shocks: the variance of in-
terest rates is smaller under LEA the larger the
variance ofdemand-side shocks. The essential conclu-
sion, however, remains: the increasein the variance of
money associated witha shiftinthe reserve accounting
system from CEA to LEA is smaller the closer deposi-
tory institutionsconform to LEA behavioralready — in
this model, the closer A is to 1.
A Graphical Presentation of l’he Results
The results are summarized conveniently in figures
2 and 3. Note that the variances ofequilibrium money
stock and interest rates given in equations 10 and 11
have both demand-side and supply-side compo-
nents. That is, they depend on both o~ ando~.Thus,
the variance of M* can be decomposed into 4~’ +
cr~y~, where cr~and a~ denote the variance of M*
due solelyto demand- and supply-side shocks, respec-
tively. The variance of P’ can be decomposed likewise.
Given the probability density function ofum andu~,
it is conceptually possible to construct a probability
region for ff~* and ff~* from the corresponding re-
gion for um. This cars be done for supply-side shocks
as well.
It seems appropriateto considerthe variancearound
the long-run equilibrium. Ifthe varianceofmoney amid
the interest rate around their long-run equilibria are
denoted by Var (Mr) and Var (i’), respectively, then
‘8itmay seem odd that the long-run equilibrium isindependent of 0
and Abut not of p.. To seewhythisisthecase, notethat in long-run
equilibrium, where M, = M~ ~ = . - - andBR, = BR, - m = - ., the
parameters 0 and A drop omit of equations 2 and 3, respectively.
This isnot true ofp. in equation 4. This would he the case even ifa
growth mate model had been specified.
‘
tm
Compame a with a - The long-
a(6+0)+(i—p.)p a(rO(i—A)+6)+p
run multiplier will be larger, equal to or smaller than the initial
mnultiplier, depending on whether a
2
r (0—i) — a’OrA + ap.p~-0.
If p. = 0, this expression will he strictly negative. If p. > 0, this
expression could be positive ornegative, depending on the rela-
tive magnitudes of the various parameters.
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fig,,e 2












Supply-Side Variability under CR4 and IRA
II I Mt
II It
Figure 2 shows a hypothetical 95 percent region for
both M* and i~associated with a corresponding 95
percent region ofdemand-side shocks. The region for
M* is larger under LEA than under CEA because the
slope of the money supply schedule is flatter under
LEA. By the same token, however, the region is
smaller for it under LEA. The slope ofthe LEA curve
approaches thatofthe CEA curve as A approaches 1. If
A = 1, the curves coincide and thevariability ofM* and
i~associatedwith demand-side shocks is independent
of the reserve accounting system.
Figure 3 shows the 95 percent region for i~’ and M*
associated with the corresponding 95 percent region
for supply-side shocks. Both regions are larger under
LEA because the corresponding supply-side compo-
nent multipliers (equations 10 and 11) are larger. These
multipliers for LEA approach those for CRA as A
approaches 1. If K = 1, these multipliers are identical
and the variability ofi~and M* associated with sup-
ply-side shocks is independent ofthe reserve account-
ing system.
Thus, if banks initially relied on changes in excess
reserves (or the discount windowor the money market)
to adjust to short-run changes in required reserves
before the introductionof LEA in September 1968, the
effectofits introduction on thevariability ofmoney and
interest rates would havebeen considerably less than
previous theoretical work would indicate. Moreover,
the return to CEA may not reduce the variability of
money and interest rates as much as many analysts
anticipate, ifdepository institutions do not change the
manner in which they make short-run adjustments in
their reserve positions.
Furthermore, itcould be argued thatthe new proce-
dure for CEA may have a minimal effect because it
lengthens the reserve accounting period from one to
twoweeks. Thus, even if depository institutions make
loans in the current period regardless of the conse-
quences ofthese activities on required reserves under
LEA, this practice may not be reduced markedly be-
cause of the lengthernng of the reserve accounting
period. Depository institutions may continue to make
loans early in the period, waiting to settle (perhaps at
the discount window, the money market or through
changes fis excess reserves) toward the end of the
period. Ofcourse, curtailment oflending activities will
affect their current-period reserve requirements
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EMPIRICAL EVIDE-NCE ON THE
VARIANCE OF MONEY A~D
INTEREST RATES
Given that the effect of the reserve accounting sys-
tem on the variability of money and interest rates
appears to be in doubt, it would be desirable to esti-
mate this effect. Unfortunately, empirical estimates
from historical data may be of limited value. The
observed variability of money and interest rates is a
function ofboth the random components of the model
and of movements associated with changes in the
policy variable through time, as well as ofchanges in
the structure ofthe system due to other changes, such
as the introduction of LEA. This fact, coupled with
documentedand undocumented changes in the objec-
tives of monetary policy, makes it difficult to separate
the effect ofthe reserve accounting structure alone on
the variability of money and interest rates. Neverthe-
less, it maybe interesting toexamine the datato seeifa
picture consistent with increased variability under
LEA emerges.
Three measures of variability are used: two relative
measures, the coefficient of variation (CV) and the
average absolute percentage change (AAPC), and one
absolute measure, the standard deviation (SD).’°
Weekly data are used for various snmbperiods from
January 1966 to November 1982. The suhperiods were
chosen on the basis of the introduction of LEA on
September 12, 1968, and on the basis of announced
changes in Federal Reserve procedures.21 The three
measures of variability, and the mean (X) ofMl appear
in table 1. The same statistics appear in table 2 for the
federal funds rate, the 3-month Treasury bill rate and
the 4—6 month commercial paper rate.
‘°Thestandard deviation is not independent ofthe imnit ofmeasure:
SD(kx) = kSDcI, where k is a constant. Thus, if the level of the
variable increases through time, the SI) ‘vu
1
increase even ifthe
vat-iahility relative tothe mean has not changed. The coefficient of
variation adjusts for this effect.
‘‘Lagged reserve accounting was introduced on September 12,
i968; atits Jamimsary 15, i970, meeting, the Federal Open Mat-ket
Committee stated a desire to place increased emphasis on the
growth ofcertain mnonetary aggregates; Congress passed Resolu-
tion 133 on March 24, 1975, requesting that the Board ofGov-
ernors set long-run ramiges for the aggregates; the Federal Open
Market Committee adopted a reserve aggregate targeting proce-
dure on October 6, 1979. See Jerry L.Jordan and Neil A. Stevens,
“The Year 1970: A Modest Beginning for Monetary Aggregates,”
this Reciemr’ (May i971), pp. i4—3i-, Nancy Jianakoplos, “The
FOMC in 1975: Announcing Monetary Targets,” this Review
(March i976), pp. 8—22; and Richard IV, Lang, “The FOMC in


















These data show that there was no incrcase in the
week to-week absolute or relative variability of Ml
immediately after the introduction ofLEA in Septem-
ber 1968. If anything, there was a reduction in
variability.22 Furthermore, though there was an in-
crease in the absolute variability of the federal funds
and the Treasury bill rates, there was essentially no
change in the relative variability. The exception was
the commercial paper rate. It became more variable in
both absolute and relative terms)3 These data are
broadly at odds with the general conclusion that the
move to LEA increased the variability of money and
interest rates.
Of course, one could argue that the theoretical re-
sults of the previous section are based on a model in
which money is controlled through reserve aggregate
targeting, and that the Federal Reserve was operating
on an interest ratetarget during this period. Thus, the
results of the theoretical model may riotbe forthcom-
ing over this period. Even an interest rate targeting
“Ifone assumesthat the absolute percentage chamige has a positive
and finite variance, then one can rely on the Central Limnit
Theorem to construct an asymptotic “t—test ofthe difièrences in
the AAPC for two subperiods. The t—ratio for the test of the first
against the second smibperiod was — 2. 75 ftr Mi, indicating a
significant reduction (at the 5 percent level) in the AAPC for NI I
after the introduction ofLRA. See Robert V. Hogg and Allen T.
Craig, Introduction to MatI,emrwtical Statistics, 4th ed. (MacMil-
lam) 1978), p. 192, for the conditions necessary to invoke the
Central Limit Theorenm,
n-pie asymptotic t-ratiosfor FF11, TEEand CPR forthe AAFC were
1.56, —0.87 and 2.82, respectively. See footnote 22 for rletails.
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procedure, however, requires the Federal Reserve to
forecast money demand. Hence, errors in short-run
money demand forecasts should have produced more
variable money under LRA.
The Federal Reserve placed more emphasis on
monetary aggregates in March 1970 and set long-run
targetsfor the aggregates beginning in 1975. Assuming
no other change occurred that would affect the
variability, one might expect the variability of Ml to
increase in these subperiods relative to the pre-LEA
period. Here the results are mixed. Both the SD and
the CV show an increase inthe variability ofMl, while
the AAPC shows essentially nochange. Broadly similar
results are obtained forthe three interest rates in table
2. The only significant increase in the AAPC for Ml
comes with the Federal Reserve’s adoption of reserve
aggregate targeting in October 1979.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis presented in this article indicates that
the type of reserve accounting structure has no effect
on the long-run equilibrium money stock; it can, how-
ever, influence the dynamic path to equilibrium if it
forces depository institutions to adjust their reserve
positions differently than they would havedoneother-
wise. In this instance, the variance of money would
increase with the shift from CEA to LEA and the
variance of the interest rate might increase as well,
depending on relative variability of demand- and sup-
ply-side shocks. In the absence of more detailed in-
formation about the exact nature of the dynamic ad-
justment process, the question of whether money or
interest rates are more variable under CEA or LEA is
empirical.
Unfortunately, the observed variability of money
and interest rates is not simplyafunction ofthereserve
accounting system; it depends also on the random
components of the model and movements associated
with changes in the policy variable through time.
Thus, it is difficult to assess the effect ofchanges in the
reserve accounting structure alone on the observed
variability of money and interest rates. The simple
evidence fromweekly datadoes not give aclear picture
of whether the movement to LEA in September 1968
increased the variability of money and interest rates.
The results differ depending on the measure of
variability one uses. Nevertheless, ifthe average abso-
lute percentage change is used as the measure of
variability, there was no significant change in the
week-to-week variability ofNil from January 5, 1966,
to November 3, 1979.
Table 2
Measures of Absolute and Relative Variability of Three Interest Rates
Federal Funds Rate’ Treasury Bill Rate Commercial Paper Rate
Permod AAPC SD CV X AAPC SD cv X AAPC SD CV X
1 565,, 5.100o 0.76% 1551 488% 166% 053% 11Db 476% 065% 046% 855 548~i
9 11 68
91988 635 1.37 1795 761 148 075 1160 644 113 112 1506 7.44
11570
12270— 383 2.58 667 705 292 163 2760 592 191 215 3034 708
326 75
4275— 161 205 3024 680 173 1.71 2659 643 125 192 2750 697
10 379
10.1079— 445 308 2181 1413 394 256 2112 1213 390 265 1990 1334
11 ‘26 82
‘Data tor week endmng two cays later than date shown
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